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Abstract
This paper investigates how the consolidation process has affected the degree of
competition within the segment of Credit Associations (CA) and Credit Cooperatives
(CC) in Japan By applying our restricted model we find that Credit Association and
Credit Cooperatives operate in monopolistic markets. The results correspond to
research findings by Tsutsui and Kamesaka (2005), and Uchida and Tsutsui (2005). Our
estimate indicates that size of mutual financial institution has a positive impact on
revenue. The same may be seen for the number of branches. In fact, it means that the
growth of banks activities is reflected in higher revenues.
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31. Introduction
The Japanese financial market has been significantly shaken up by the burst of asset
price bubble in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a direct consequence, the banking
sector has undergone a forced consolidation process which had been reflected by a
large number of bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions and consequently stronger
competition within the banking sector.
This paper investigates how the consolidation process has affected the degree of
competition within the segment of Credit Associations (CA) and Credit Cooperatives
(CC) in Japan. These financial institutions play a significant role within the financial
mark and their share in terms of deposits and loans is 20 percent and 25 percent
respectively. The methodological concept of this study is based on non-structural
models H statistics (Panzar and Rosse (1987)). This methodology is considered as a
standard method to estimate a degree of competition across the industry.
The empirical literature of applying the SCP and Panzar-Rosse models in the
Japanese sector is rather limited. Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) analysed the competition
conditions of commercial banks in Japan in the last quarter of the 20 th century. Tsutsui
and Kamesaka (2005) analysed the competitiveness within the Japanese securities
industry. Alley (1993) research estimated competition conditions in Japan by using
data of the Japanese regional financial institutions (Regional banks, Mutual banks (the
former of Second regional banks), and Credit Associations). Findings supported
collusive behaviours among the Japanese financial institutions.
Satake and Tsutsui (2003) focused on one prefecture Kyoto in Japan and analyzed
the SCP and efficiency hypotheses in lending market by regional banks and credit
associations. Their result supported the efficiency hypothesis. Tsutsui (2005) discussed
the national credit associations in the period between 1993 and 1997, and the results
supported the efficient hypothesis. Tsutsui et al. (2006) reapplied the methodological
framework introduced in Tsutsui (2005) for City banks over the period 1974 - 2001.
They concluded that that the efficient hypothesis is supported in the case of
organizational efficiency measure and the efficient hypothesis is not accepted in the
4case of scale diseconomy measure.
Molyneux et al. (1996) tested contestability conditions in the Japanese banking
sector for City banks and Regional banks. They considered that the existing banks in
Japanese banking market tend to interfere with the new entry from the outside, and it
should affect to the price setting. In fact, they measured the H statistics (Panzar-Rosse
test) with the revenue function using two years’ cross-section data (1986 and 1988).
Their results showed that the banking market in 1986 was in monopolistic or
oligopolistic conditions, and, in 1988, it changed into the monopolistic competition.
They concluded, therefore, that it was caused by the contestable behaviour of the
existing banks that there are only a small number of de novo banks in Japanese
domestic lending market. However, they also represented another conclusion that the
competitive price would be realized through increased competition in the future. Niimi
(1998) analyzed the H-statistics to examine the relationship between the City banks
and their customer companies in Japan during 1980 and 1990. Two interesting results
were found that oligopolistic condition during the bubble boom of the 1980s and the
market in the 1990s was in the monopolistic competition. That is, the degree of
competition had increased.
This strand of research motivates and guides our empirical research about the
competition conditions in the segment of CA and CC. There are two main motivations
for our research. Firstly, there is limited empirical research tackling the market
structure of the Japanese mutual financial institutions. Secondly, we compare
structural and non structural models that could reinforce our results and consequently
policy recommendation.
The paper is structured as follow. Section 2 provides an overview about the role
and place of Credit Associations and Credit Cooperatives within the Japanese banking
sector. The following Section reviews the recent empirical literature. Section 4
describes applied models. Section 5 discusses empirical results and Final Section
concludes.
52. The role and place of Credit Association and Credit Cooperatives
Financial institutions in Japan could be divided into three broad categories4: (i) City
banks and Trust banks, (ii) Regional banks and Second regional banks, (iii) Credit
Associations and Credit Cooperatives. Firs two groups are traditional commercial
banks with their main objective function, i.e., to maximise profit. The third group
includes mutual (cooperative) financial institutions that their main objective is to
focus on supporting the development of their local communities.
A further distinctive characteristic is that City banks and Trust banks have their
branches across the country. Regional banks and Second regional banks mainly arrange
their branches only in their prefecture. CA and CC set their branches in their local
communities; cities, towns and villages. CA and CC as small business financial
institutions also take a different organization form from commercial banks.
Muramoto (2005) argues that the main role of CA and CC is the membership policy.
Thus, the main purpose of these institutions is not only profit maximization but also
welfare of their members. A further different aspect of CA and CC is the requirement
to contribute to a local community. The close link with local communities and
individuals supports small companies with innovative projects and particular skills.
CC and CA have also different historical background compared with the ordinary
banks. The act on CA was introduced on the 15 th of June, 1951, and was consisted of
92 articles.
Credit Associations are similar to other financial intermediaries, i.e., provide
financial services as collecting deposits and providing loans. However, the lending
activities are restricted. In the article 53.2., it is defined that “… the government
ordinance sets that CA can offer loan services to non-member … unless job
performance of the Credit Association is interfered”. The government ordinance means
the enforcement orders of the Law of CA. The article 8 in its order states that the
lending services to non-member must be confined within 20% of total amount of
4 This part does not consider Long-term credit banks because they were generally
positioned as the half-government and half-private financial institutions.
6lending. Additionally, it is also written that the decision-making of business policy
must be done in the general representative meeting, in the article 50 of the Law of CA.
A further distinctive feature between CA and Commercial Banks is the preferential
tax system. CA and CC are preferential treatments such as the reduced tax rate5, and
the inclusion in expenses of cash dividends depending on business charges (Article
60.2.).6
Table 1 shows the relative size of private financial institutions in Japan. It may be
of interest to show that total loans and total deposits of CA are much larger than not
only those of Second regional banks but also Trust banks. In particular, total deposits
of CA are nearly 30% of City banks and 42.8% of Regional banks. However, the total
volume asset of CA is much smaller than all kind of commercial banks. In contrast, all
data of CC are much smaller than those of CA. These facts mean that CA have a very
important place, but CC play a much smaller role in financial industry of Japan.
Table 2 indicates the change of institutions and employees over the analysed
period. Over eight years number of institutions was reduced by 25% and the number of
employees was also correspondingly reduced. However, the membership over the same
period increased by 7%.
Table 3 provides the same information about Credit Cooperatives. We see that the
decline was even more dramatic comparing Credit Association. The number of
Cooperatives declined by more than 50% and the number of employees was cut by
more than 40%. Unlike Credit Association the membership has been reduced by 16%.
5 In fact, the amount of corporate tax for ordinary corporation such as commercial
banks is ‘… the 34.5% of total amount of income in each year’ (Article 66), while that
for the cooperative unions such as Credit associations and Credit unions is ‘… the
25%’ (Article 66.2.).
6 The new capital adequacy requirements to the cooperative financial institutions will
be started at March, 2007, as well as the case of ordinary banks. In the risk assessment
for the calculation of capital adequacy ratio, not only credit risk and market risk but
also operational risk will be included.
73. Data and Methodology
The sample includes about 300 Credit Associations and 200 Credit Cooperatives over
the period 1999-2005. Data are collected from the annual reports.
Market concentration measures
As banking industry deals with multiple products, it is difficult to define all
structures from the simple market range. And there is not adequate measurement
reflecting the degree of monopoly as market structure. Heggestad (1979) indicates that
there are three problems with measuring the concentration of the banking market.
Firstly, to find the appropriate general index for the concentration, secondly, to select
the relevant economic variables for measuring the difference of bank size, and finally
to explain the difference of competition of inter-institutions, between banks and
non-banks.
Research studies apply two kinds of concentration index. First, the k-bank
concentration ratio as the k-bank concentration index is used most frequently in
empirical studies. The following equation is employed to aggregate the market share of
the k-large banks in the market;
 
k
i ik
SCR
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where CRk is the k-bank concentration index; S i is the market share of bank i.
Although this index emphasises on the k leading banks, the remaining banks in the
market are neglected. There are no rules for the determination of the number of banks.
Therefore, the number of banks included in the concentration index could be
determined at discretion. The concentration index is considered as one point on the
concentration curve, and is the first-order measure ranging between zero and one. In
the case that there are an infinitely large number of banks having equivalent sizes (that
is, if the k-bank value is relatively small to the number of total banks), its index
approaches to zero. And on the contrary, the figure would be near unity if the number
of the whole industry is incorporated in the calculation for the concentration
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   . This formula is a decreasing function to the number of
banks in the market, and it is equal to ne=k/CRk.
Next indicator is the Herfindahl-Hirshman index (HHI). This is the most common
measure as the concentration index in the theoretical literature. And it is often used as
the benchmark to estimate the other concentration measures against because the HHI
includes the impacts from total banks. The function form for the HHI is:
 
n
i i
SHHI
1
2
It represents as the sum of squared market share. The HHI expresses the importance of
large banks by assigning the large weight. And by including each bank individually,
the problems such as the arbitrary cut-off and the insensitivity to the share distribution
are avoided. The HHI index is ranged between 1/n and 1. If all banks have same size in
the market, the HHI would approach to the minimum value, which is the reciprocal of
the number of banks. On the contrary, the index would be unity in the case of
monopoly. As the HHI reacts well to the number of firms and the variance, it is shown
as the decent index. However, as these measures are mutually related, the selection of
market structure does not have any critical importance for the test of the SCP
hypothesis. (Heggestad (1979))
In general, the structure of concentration index becomes either discrete or
cumulative. The discrete measure of concentration corresponds to the arbitrary point
on the concentration curve. For instance, the k-bank concentration belongs in the group
of this individual measure. The advantage of an individual measure is that the required
data is simple and definite. There were supporters as well as opponents, in the previous
literature. However, both researches discuss about the impact of concentration to the
banking market structure. The most of supporters have a viewpoint that the market
behaviour, which is dominated by a small number of banks, would not influence in the
total number of banks in the market. In other words, the concentration index based on
the total number of banks does not necessarily represent large size, and it could just
9change the ultimate conclusion limitedly. In contrast, the opponents show the
viewpoint that every bank in the market has some effect to the market direction and
there is severe inadequacy in the individual index. That is, it is asserted that some
structural changes in the industry, not including in the index, are unfortunately ignored
in those individual indices. Even the competitive behaviour by small sized market
players might have significant market power as well as large player.
Non structural model – H statistics
In this section, non-structural measure on the market competition is discussed with
the Panzar-Rosse approach. The Panzar-Rosse approach is a test which is based on the
comparative static properties of an induced-form revenue equation. The competitive
behavior of banks is made decisions from the comparative static properties of a
reduced-form revenue equation in the method by Panzar and Rosse (1987). Panzar and
Rosse assume that banks would operate in long-term equilibrium, while bank
performance is also affected by the action of the other market participants. Their
model presumes that the price elasticity of demand (e) would become greater than
unity, and that the homogeneous cost structure is hold. In order to calculate the output
quantity and bank number in equilibrium, it is assumed that bank profits are
maximized. Thus, banks attempt to maximize profits by performing business where
marginal revenue of banks becomes equal to marginal cost.
R’ i (x i, n, z i) – C’ i (x i, w i, t i) = 0
x i is an output of bank, i, n is the number of banks, w i is a vector of m factor input
price of bank, i. z i is a vector of exogenous variable to shift the revenue equation of
bank, and t i is a vector of exogenous variable to shift the cost function of bank. In
equilibrium, this relation constrains that bank profit would become zero.
R*i (x*, n*, z i) – C*i (x*, w, t) = 0
Variables with mark, *, means the value in the equilibrium condition. Market power is
measured as the ratio of the change in the factor of input price (∂w) by reflecting the 
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equilibrium revenue (∂R*i). Panzar and Rosse (1987) defined the ‘H-statistic’, which is
the sum of the elasticity of the reduced revenue function with regard to the factor
prices, as the competition measure.
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The figure of H-statistics is located between -∞ and 1. If the market is monopolistic,
the value of H is smaller than 0. The value from 0 to 1 means the monopolistic
competition, and value 1 indicates the perfect competition.
In the measurement of H statistics, it is required as assumption or condition that
the market attains the long-term equilibrium. The empirical test is considered from the
following story. At the competitive capital market in the equilibrium, the risk-adjusted
return is uniformized between banks. Thus it is considered that the input prices should
not be correlated statistically with the rate of return. In contrast, if the market is not in
the equilibrium, the increase (decrease) of input price makes the rate of return drop
(rise) temporally. The change of input price would be correlated with the rate of return
significantly. Therefore, it may be tested if the market is in a long equilibrium by
replacing the bank revenues by return on asset (ROA) and calculating the E statistics in
the equation.7 In other words, if the E statistics is smaller than 0 (E stat < 0), it means
the market is in disequilibrium. And if it is equal to 0 (E stat = 0) statistically, it
represents the market equilibrium. (Shaffer (1982), Molyneux et al. (1994, 1996),
Classens and Laeven (2004), Matthews et al. (2006))
With regards to the H statistics of the Panzar and Rosse approach, the model is
specified as follows (Panzar and Rosse (1987), Nathan and Neave (1989), and DeBandt
and Davis (2000)):
lnR = α0 + α1lnPL+ α2lnPK + α3lnPF +α4 lnS + α5lnX +ε
where R is the revenue of banks, PL is the input price of labour, PK is the input price
of capital, and PF is the input price of financial fund. These three input prices are used
7 E statistics is defined as the sum of the input-price coefficient in which the
explained variable is the rate of return.
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as endogenous variables, and the sum of the coefficients of these three variables are
defined as the H statistics. In fact, PL employs the ratio of the personnel costs to the
member of employees as the proxy. The ratio of nonpersonnal expenses to the total cost
of personal property and fixed property could become a proxy of PK. And the cost of
raising funds to total costs (including deposits, the CD, debt loan, and credit) would be
a proxy of PF. Bank-Specific Factors are additional explanatory variables, and reflect
the gap such as risk, cost, size, and bank structure. Ratio of risk capital fund to asset,
ratio of loans to total asset, or ratio of the nonperforming loans to total loans are
considered as a risk factor. Although there are some other variables which refer to
bank-properties, total asset is often accepted as the size factor of banks.
We also include the exogenous variables into our equation; market size (S) and
further characteristics (X) that should capture the behaviour of CC and CA. The
determinants of X are considered the difference of risks, deposit mix, and
organizational structures. In this study, the risk factor uses the ratio of loan loss
reserves in total gross loans, and the deposit-mix factor employs total deposits to total
assets.
From the above developments, the model of the H-statistics by the Panzar and
Rosse approach on the Japanese cooperative financial institutions is derived as
following revenue functions:
[Equation for H statistics]
  BR
AST
DEP
GRSLOAN
LLRASTPPPREV FKL lnlnlnlnlnln 76543210
Equation 1
where:
REV = total revenue, PL = Price of Labour; (Personnel Expenses / Number of
Employees), PK = Price of Capital; (Other Administrative Expenses and Other
Operating Expenses / Total Asset), PF = Price of Fund; (Interest Expenses / Deposit),
AST = total bank assets, DEP = total deposit, LLR = Loan Loss Reserves, GRSLOAN =
12
Total gross loans and BR = number of branches. The H statistics is calculated
as 321  H .
[Equation for E statistics (Long-term equilibrium)]
In addition, the estimated equation for the market equilibrium is defined as
follows. Here, the new explained variable, , refers to the return on assets (ROA). The
E statistics is calculated as 321  E .
    BR
AST
DEP
GRSLOAN
LLRASTPPP FKL lnlnlnlnln1ln 76543210
Equation 2
where:
 = Return on Asset (ROA), PL = Price of Labour, PK = Price of Capital, PF = Price of
Fund, AST=total bank assets, DEP = total deposit, LLR = Loan Loss Reserves,
GRSLOAN = Total gross loans, BR = number of branches,
The empirical test for the H statistics incorporates the fixed effect into the error
term. It is possible to estimate more properly by including the institution-specific fixed
effect ( ) and the period specific fixed effect (  ).
4. Empirical Results
Table 4 and 5 show the empirical results of Rosse-Panzar’s H-statistics and long term
equilibrium test (E stat) for Japanese Credit associations and Credit cooperatives,
respectively. The H statistics is represented in the third section from the bottom in
Table 4. Although the value of H-stat is 0.64 in the no fixed effect, it remarkably
decrease to 0.575 in 1-way fixed effect model and 0.51 in 2-way model. These three
values all are significantly different from H=0 and H=1 in 1% level, respectively.
Therefore, it can be concluded that Credit associations and Credit cooperatives are in
the monopolistic competitive market.
As for the other control variables, it is found that the logarithmic asset (lnAST) is
positively related to total revenue (lnREV). It suggests that the scale merit acts to the
cooperative financial institutions significantly. As the ratio of loan loss reserve to
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gross loan (LLR/GRSLOAN) is used as the figure for risky behaviour, we expected it
will have a negative relationship with total revenue. However, the result showed
positive relationship with revenue. The ratio of total deposit to total asset is employed
as the measure of bank performance. As the increase of its figure means the growth of
the expenses in total balance, it is expected to be negative number. The result followed
our expectation.
Our estimate shows that H statistics is significant and positive with values from
0.51 to 0.63 depending on an estimation technique. However, if the market is not in the
equilibrium, it is difficult to use the value of H statistics as the measure of market
competition. Thus, in Table 5, the result of equilibrium test by Shaffer is represented.
The E statistics are indicated in the third bottom section on the table. The E-statistics
on no-fixed effect is 0.07 and it could not reject the null hypothesis, E=0, in which the
market attain the long term equilibrium. In contrast, the E statistics of 1-way and
2-way model are -0.266 and -0.300, respectively. These two results significantly reject
the hypothesis, E=0, in 1% level. Therefore, as a result, it is difficult to conclude that
the result of H statistics in Table 4 is available. In other words, from these estimations,
it was not found the fact that Japanese Credit associations and Credit cooperatives are
in the monopolistic competitive market.
5. Conclusions
This study analyses competition conditions of Mutual Financial Institutions in Japan.
We apply a traditional non-structural methods introduced by Panzar and Rosse (1987).
The analysed sample is a representative sample of Credit Associations and Credit
Cooperatives operating in Japan.
By applying our restricted model we find that Credit Association and Credit
Cooperatives operate in monopolistic markets. The results correspond to research
findings by Molyneux et al. (1996), Tsutsui and Kamesaka (2005), and Uchida and
Tsutsui (2005).
Our estimate indicates that size of mutual financial institution has a positive
14
impact on revenue. The same may be seen for the number of branches. In fact, it means
that the growth of banks activities is reflected in higher revenues. On the other hand,
the coefficient of the applied ratio (Deposits/Assets) has a negative sign and is
statistically significant that corresponds with the notion that the increase in deposit
means reduction of interest revenue for banks. However, a further research is needed in
order to confirm our results.
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Table. 1 Relative size of private financial institutions in 2008
No.
Loans and
discounts
outstanding
(banking
accounts)
Deposits
Assets
(banking
accounts)
City banks 6 2,128,980 2,707,135 415,541,661
Regional banks 64 1,485,468 1,961,177 224,747,484
Second regional banks 45 429,309 555,619 61,215,264
Trust banks 7 322,933 351,869 62,319,938
Long-term credit banks 2 93,067 76,943 168,260
Credit associations 282 635,433 1,137,275 1,204,216
Credit cooperatives 164 93,828 163,300 175,306
Note: JPY 100 millions
Source: “Economics Statistics Monthly” (Bank of Japan), “Financial Statements of all
banks” (Japanese Bankers Association), “Shinkin Central Bank Monthly Review”
(Shinkin Central Bank), “Main accounts of National Credit cooperatives” National
Table. 2 Number of institutions, members, & administrators of Credit Associations
No of institutions No of members No of employees
1998.3 401 8,599,612 2,952
1999.3 396 8,733,839 2,950
2000.3 386 8,876,360 2,900
2001.3 371 8,941,138 2,804
2002.3 349 8,981,084 2,734
2003.3 326 9,001,391 2,557
2004.3 306 9,091,805 2,396
2005.3 298 9,134,192 2,342
2006.3 292 9,190,783 2,272
Source: Shinkin Central Bank Monthly Review
18
Table. 3 Number of Cooperatives, members, & administrators of Credit Cooperatives
No of Co-operatives No of members No of administrators
1998.3 351 4,321,921 38,246
1999.3 322 4,146,352 35,492
2000.3 291 4,083,786 33,096
2001.3 280 4,099,015 31,078
2002.3 247 3,966,008 28,560
2003.3 191 3,426,813 24,422
2004.3 181 3,502,008 23,510
2005.3 175 3,579,427 22,953
2006.3 172 3,626,027 22,482
2007.3 168 3,643,119 22,034
Source: Financial Statement analysis of national Credit cooperatives
Table. 4 Empirical results of H statistics (t-values in parenthesis)
Normal 1-way Fixed Effects 2-way Fixed Effects
Constant -0.631405*** -0.239914*** -1.777894***
(-4.782953) (-0.974212) (-5.48283)
lnPL 0.259295*** 0.287602*** 0.32601***
(14.0167) (15.74347) (16.32063)
lnPK 0.253802*** 0.159356*** 0.151382***
(29.01441) (18.06289) (18.06202)
lnPF 0.12668*** 0.128344*** 0.03586***
(35.30635) (35.13737) (5.153545)
lnAST 0.853778*** 0.866786*** 0.917918***
(124.7072) (47.92072) (41.93366)
LLR/GRSLOAN 0.008539*** 0.005051*** 0.00568***
(7.589169) (3.737209) (4.413847)
DEP/AST -0.519362*** -1.284971*** -1.186113***
(-4.657328) (-6.373412) (-6.173646)
lnBR 0.16603*** 0.006673 -0.020813
(21.78269) (0.356798) (-1.075757)
R2 0.983202 0.993612 0.994363
R2 adj. 0.983159 0.99223 0.993125
H0:  0 ------ F(482,2260)=
7.641567***
F(482,2254)=
8.901942***
H0: 0 ------ ------ F(488,2254)=
50.00472***
H-stat 0.639777 0.575301 0.513253
H0:H=0 F(1, 2742)=
1018.154***
F(1, 2260)=
870.1503***
F(1, 2254)=
567.3448***
H0:H=1 F(1, 2742)=
322.7756***
F(1, 2260)=
474.204***
F(1, 2254)=
510.2608***
F 22927.24 718.9037 803.1922
Obs. 2750 2750 2750
Note: (i) each figure below the coefficients is t-value., (ii) *** significant at the 1%,
** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%
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Table. 5 Empirical results of E statistics (market equilibrium) (t-values in parenthesis)
Normal 1-way Fixed Effects 2-way Fixed Effects
Constant 2.316747*** 2.145545 5.308016***
(4.696912) (1.573746) (2.779088)
lnPL 0.198152*** 0.041028 -0.028384
(2.826574) (0.406467) (-0.239911)
lnPK -0.130194*** -0.323123*** -0.31113***
(-3.793688) (-6.269437) (-5.986621)
lnPF 0.002997 0.015924 0.039216
(0.22061) (0.804871) (0.979633)
lnAST 0.03264 0.366338*** 0.180626
(1.268226) (3.653386) (1.410886)
LLR/GRSLOAN -0.023581*** -0.046493*** -0.041729***
(-5.080337) (-5.684217) (-5.04634)
DEP/AST -4.310465*** -8.901956*** -9.299583***
(-10.3369) (-7.690717) (-7.983086)
lnBR -0.029418 -0.191122* -0.077286
(-1.031087) (-1.851629) (-0.692762)
R2 0.101376 0.314664 0.321391
R2 adj. 0.098925 0.153854 0.15974
H0:  0 ------ F(482,2084)=
1.345593***
F(482,2078)=
1.302494***
H0:  0 ------ ------ F(488,2078)=
1.380569***
E-stat 0.070955 -0.26617 -0.300298
H0:E=0 F(1, 2566)=
0.854768
F(1, 2084)=
5.951714**
F(1, 2078)=
5.402601**
F 41.35395 1.956739 1.988175
Obs. 2574 2574 2574
Note: (i) each figure below the coefficients is t-value., (ii) *** significant at the 1%,
** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%
